“THE CHINA LOBBY”: INFLUENCES ON U.S.-CHINA
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST WAR PERIOD, 1949-1954
By Jeff Blackwell
Generally defined, the “China Lobby” was a broad network of people,
both foreign and domestic, whose interests coalesced around the goal of
overthrowing of communism in China. It consisted of well-financed
Nationalist Chinese officials in collaboration with right-wing U.S. po
litical elites who worked toward the common goal of supporting
Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of mainland China from Mao Zedong and
the Communist forces.1 Aided by the anticommunist environment of
the 1950s, the Lobby’s loose affiliation of influential individuals—
including associates in the private sector, media, and politics—exerted
considerable pressure on U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning
China.
It is important to note that the term “lobby” in the United States
usually describes a private group that attempts to influence policy.
1
Ross H. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), ix-x. Koen’s book was actually withdrawn from publication—i.e., suppressed by
efforts of the China Lobby—after printing in 1960 to remain legally unpublished until
1974.
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Though similar, the China Lobby encompassed a more broadly based
consensus of individuals that cooperated in the promotion of anticom
munism and a pro-Chiang U.S. policy. Indeed, the Lobby operated in
an unconventional manner and existed without any particular leader or
organization at its center. Yet, it effectively exerted significant pressures
on the U.S. government without going through regular channels of
diplomacy. Moreover, the Lobby took advantage of U.S.
anticommunist sentiments by circulating propaganda associating sup
port of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime with loyalty to the United States and
the advocacy of democracy abroad.
This study will examine how the China Lobby attempted to influ
ence U.S. foreign policy toward a pro-Chinese Nationalist agenda in the
1950s. Using various tactics, including use of political lobbying,
sympathetic media outlets, and attacks on critics of pro-Nationalist
policy, the China Lobby distorted public and political perceptions re
garding U.S. policy toward China and effectively promoted a proChiang Kai-shek foreign policy. Indeed, the China Lobby indeed held
significant sway over U.S. foreign policy after 1949 and, particularly
after Mao’s victory in mainland China and the subsequent U.S. involve
ment in the Korean War, made use of an increasingly receptive
American public as the domestic climate in the United States became
increasingly anticommunist.
This examination of the China Lobby will scrutinize the organiza
tion’s political influence during the period 1949-1954 and will address
the following questions: What was the China Lobby? Who were mem
bers of the China Lobby? How, and why, did it form? What means did
the Lobby use to influence U.S.-China foreign policy? And, were the
Lobby’s efforts successful in exerting pressure on U.S. foreign policy
regarding China?
At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, U.S-China relations
had reached an impasse. The Communists had defeated Chiang-Kai
shek’s forces and created a conundrum for U.S. policymakers. Many
had not foreseen the Communist victory and Chiang’s virtual exile to
the island of Taiwan raised new dilemmas for policy and exacerbated
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fears of Communist domination of Asia. As a Communist invasion of
the island seemed inevitable, the U.S. weighed its options.
U.S. policymakers were divided on the issue of whether to defend
Chiang on Taiwan if the Communists invaded. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, who had dealt with Chiang extensively in WWII, preferred to
abandon the island, noting that if any of Chiang’s disciples controlled
the island it was doomed to fall to the Communists. For Acheson, the
primary goal was to wean Mao Zedong away from Stalin and Soviet
domination, thereby driving a wedge between the Communist states.
However, prominent Republican Senators William Knowland and
Robert Taft, joined by former President Herbert Hoover, vehemently
opposed such a course and demanded that the U.S. protect Taiwan.2
President Truman tended to agree with Acheson. In January 1950,
Truman issued a statement declaring that, while the U.S. would give
Taiwan financial assistance, U.S. military forces would not intervene
should the island fall victim to a Communist attack.3 Furthermore, the
current situation seemed to present a favorable opportunity for for
malized relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). The strongest opposition to formalizing relations with the PRC
rested with Chiang’s supporters in public office, but even they saw the
bleak reality of the Chinese Nationalist cause. Yet, in late June of 1955,
any hope of Acheson’s policy coming to fruition was unhinged by the
outbreak of the Korean War and the eventual Chinese involvement in
the conflict. Chiang Kai-shek supporters capitalized on the surge of
U.S. anticommunism and challenged the existing “China policy.”
The China Lobby coalesced in this political climate, bringing to
gether people with differing motives and varying degrees of interest in
China under the ideological banner of anticommunism. They
constituted a diverse and disparate group of individuals composed of
both public and private interests, including ardent supporters of
Chiang Kai-shek and those more interested in using the Lobby’s influ
ence to further their own agenda. Regardless of origin, the China Lobby
2
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 166-167.
3
Ibid., 170.
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association, ranging from religious leaders and businessmen to
politicians and journalists, coalesced in a common purpose of anticom
munism and the Chinese Nationalist cause.
Part of the China Lobby’s success was due to the lack of centralized
structural organization. Even in contemporary studies a precise defini
tion of who the China Lobby consisted of is difficult to ascertain.
Indeed, the Lobby was certainly a mysterious entity in the 1950s. As
The New York Times reported in 1951, “The China Lobby, despite
references to it in and outside Congress, never has been presented in
any tangible shape.”4 However, despite the mystery surrounding the
organization, particular individuals were unquestionably involved in
the advocating the Lobby’s agenda.
Although members were all influential in their own right, among
the more notable was Alfred Kohlberg, a wealthy New York busi
nessman who would later become a fanatical anticommunist and proChiang supporter. He published over a dozen articles attacking the
United States’ non-interventionist policy toward China and those that
supported it and subsidized at least two magazines supporting his views.
He would also serve as chairman of the board of the American Chinese
Policy Association (ACPA), an organization that surpassed all others in
its directness of attacks on U.S. policy in China and contained consid
erable influence in Congress.5
Another intriguing affiliate of the China Lobby was Henry R.
Luce, publisher of Time and Life newsmagazines. Luce held an ardent
conviction that China was a prime target for U.S. uplift—whether as a
model of political and economic development, religious faith, or diplo
matic and military support. He also believed that Americans had a
categorical obligation to fulfill in China’s national destiny.
Unsurprisingly, he made Chiang Kai-shek the cover story of Time
magazine a record ten times.6 Henry Luce’s role in advocating the
4
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China Lobby’s agenda through his media outlets was a fundamental
aspect to the China Lobby’s success.
In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious
in the Chinese Civil War, Lobby supporter’s worst fears were con
firmed about the spread of communism in Asia. The Communist vic
tory shocked many Americans, who had often associated Chiang’s
regime with the efforts to establish democracy in China. In the minds
of many Americans, the Communist victory was also equated a victory
for the Soviet Union. Due to this perception, a large portion of the
public, the press, and the membership of Congress came to believe the
charge that Chiang had been “sold out” by the U.S. government.7 The
development of closer relations between Peking and Moscow following
the Communist victory, combined with the anticommunist feeling this
engendered in the United States, made such allegations seem all the
more justified.
In response to accusations that the U.S. had abandoned Chiang
Kai-shek, the U.S. Department of State released the “China White Pa
per,” a massive volume of documents and explanations to justify its
policy of disengagement from the beleaguered Nationalist cause. By
emphasizing the fact that the United States was not responsible for the
fall of the Nationalist regime, the State Department sought to mollify
opponents of its non-interventionist China policy, or at least to justify
that policy to the American public in general. The effort failed, how
ever, and provided the Republican Party with a useful political issue.
Conservative members of the Republican Party saw their opportunity
to deride the Truman administration’s handling of events in China,
and they attached their interests to those of the China Lobby. In the
years to follow, the China Lobby bitterly charged that the State Depart
ment had “betrayed” Chiang, the United States’ wartime ally, and
launched campaigns to identify those allegedly responsible for the “loss”
of China to Communist forces.8 In this alarmist climate, the “loss” of
China debate helped to accelerate the momentum of the China Lobby.
7
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The Lobby’s hope for the success its agenda increased exponen
tially in June of 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th
Parallel in a massive invasion of South Korea. Once the U.S. decided to
defend South Korea, it would be increasingly difficult to explain why
Taiwan should not also be defended. If the Chinese Communists at
tacked the island and simultaneously interfered with the defense of
South Korea, the Truman administration would be terribly vulnerable
to attacks from Chiang’s supporters in the U.S. When Chinese forces
eventually became involved in the conflict, U.S. opposition to Mao’s
regime hardened and simultaneously widened the circle of Americans
who sought Chiang’s return to power.
As the climate of anticommunist ardor increased in the U.S.,
Senate hearings were held in April of 1950 to investigate Senator
Joseph McCarthy’s accusations that State Department officials and
some experts on China had been involved in a pro-communist conspir
acy to influence the Truman administration’s China policy. Popular
ized during the Senate hearings, the term “China Lobby” came into use
at this time. The phrase gained greater prominence in June and July
1951, during the Senate hearings on Truman’s removal of General
Douglas MacArthur from his command in Korea. The subject of the
China Lobby was introduced because MacArthur argued, in line with
the China Lobby’s charges, that General George Marshall’s mission to
China in 1945-1946 had been “one of the greatest blunders in Ameri
can history.”9 Pro-Chiang forces had criticized Marshall for having
attempted to force Chiang into a political alliance with the
Communists, and later, as Secretary of State, for having allegedly sabo
taged U.S. aid to Chiang, therefore guaranteeing the “loss” of China to
the Communists. Secretary of State Dean Acheson countered
MacArthur’s allegations by announcing that Truman had instructed all
relevant government agencies to investigate the activities of the China
Lobby.10
In support of Acheson, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse asserted
that “the China Lobby,” or the group supporting Chiang Kai-shek, had
9
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“for several years been conducting a violent campaign against American
policies in China”11 Alfred Kohlberg, retorted, “The real ‘China Lobby’
is the pro-Communist lobby within the State Department.”12 In re
sponse to the investigation, pro-Chiang forces denounced Acheson and
demanded an investigation of “pro-Communist” China lobbies within
the administration.
The congressional investigation of the China Lobby led by Senator
Morse and others produced less than substantial findings. The probe
had unearthed little in terms of concrete information about the opera
tion of the Lobby despite clear indications that a substantial amount of
money, largely from undisclosed sources, had been expended for a proNationalist publicity and propaganda campaign and that a very close
connection existed between the campaign and “certain politicians and
public figures.”13 In the meantime, China Lobby forces, galvanized by
the heightened voice among anti-Communist crusaders in Congress
during the Korean War, intensified their efforts to discredit the
administration’s China policy and to advocate continuing support of
Chiang. Indeed, in the fierce anti-Communist climate of the time, the
Lobby’s message found wide support, and critics of the Lobby exposed
themselves to harsh censure from pro-Chiang advocates.
A major characteristic of the China Lobby was the way it propa
gated its arguments to the public. Indeed, the China Lobby became
controversial for its extraordinary ability to discredit State Department
officials and others for “betrayal” and “treason.” In historian Ross
Koen’s view, “the China lobby was so successful in securing [public]
acceptance of its explanation of America’s role in the Far East…because
its propaganda exploited…the absence of an informed understanding of
events in China”14 Such tactics appeared to have swayed a wide variety
of Americans against the U.S. government’s policies toward China by
11
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effectively utilizing propaganda that identified Chiang’s regime with
American ideals and contended that Americans had a special responsi
bility for China’s development.
One of the ways that the China Lobby influenced public opinion
and pressured foreign policy decisions regarding China was to form
committees. The most active of these committees was the ACPA. From
its creation in the 1940s until 1953, the ACPA published a tremendous
volume of literature in the form of letters, pamphlets, brochures, re
prints of Communist directives, press releases, and book reviews.15
Most of these were prepared and published in the office of Alfred
Kohlberg, who tirelessly advocated the China Lobby’s agenda through
the efforts of the ACPA. Among the other influential committees were
the China Emergency Committee and the Committee to Defend
America by Aiding Anti-Communist.16 Not surprisingly, these various
committees consisted of a similar membership. Thus, to a large degree,
these committees’ agendas blurred together, and they coordinated their
efforts to achieve the most widespread effect on public opinion and
foreign policy decisions.
Another committee that efficiently swayed foreign policy decisions
regarding China was the Committee of One Million. The idea of the
committee was conceived in October 1953 by Marvin Liebman, in
partnership with Senator Walter Judd and Count Nicolas De Roche
fort, with the intention of initiating a petition listing eight reasons
opposing Communist China to the United Nations. The petition
would be presented to a broad list of VIP’s in Congress, Republicans
and Democrats alike, with the goal of giving the petition legitimacy
when it was published in a newspaper advertisement to solicit more
signatures.
Among the more prominent members to sign the initial petition
were former President Herbert Hoover and former Ambassador Joseph
C. Grewt. Eventually garnering over one million signatures—hence the
Committee of One Million—the petition’s signers included: forty-nine
members of Congress (twenty-three of whom were Democrats), twelve
15
16
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governors, twenty retired generals and admirals (including General
George C. Marshall), fourteen prominent religious leaders, and numer
ous scientists, educators, and business leaders.17 The New York Times
reported at the time that New York’s four most prominent veteran’s
organizations were mobilizing to collect signatures for the petition.
According to the petitions spokesman, it was “a protest against the
indignities to which those Chinese have been subjected by the ugly
dogma and practice of international Communist imperialism.”18 At the
collection of the millionth signature, the petition was presented to
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who received the initial signatories in
the White House and allowed Judd to make his case for denying the
Communist China membership in the United Nations. It is difficult to
assess how effective the petition was on President Eisenhower, yet at a
news conference on July 7, 1953 Eisenhower announced that he would
oppose Communist China’s admittance to the UN.19 In this instance, it
does not seem unreasonable to speculate that the China Lobby did in
deed help to sway foreign policy decisions concerning China.
Another means by which the China Lobby sought to influence
foreign policy was through the media, undoubtedly one of the most
efficient ways to disseminate propaganda. Alfred Kohlberg alone subsi
dized the pro-Chiang magazines The China Monthly and Plain Talk as
outlets to denounce United States policy in China. Articles from The
China Monthly frequently found their way into the congressional re
cord, and the magazine has been cited as a source of China Lobby
propaganda in congressional hearings.20 Moreover, The China Monthly
frequently served as the major organ for the dissemination of the views
of Americans associated with the China Lobby. In fact, neither maga
zine served not as a financially viable business, they were primarily
mouthpieces for the diffusion of propaganda critical of U.S. foreign
policy toward China.
17
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A number of other influential publications also helped to advocate
the agenda of the Chinese National Government and the China Lobby.
Foremost among these publications were Collier’s, The Saturday
Evening Post, Readers Digest, U.S. News and World Report, and both
Time and Life newsmagazines.21 Additionally, newspapers such as The
Washington Times-Herald, the Los Angeles Examiner, the San Francisco
Examiner, and the Oakland Tribune were also consistent in their criti
cism of U.S. policy and in their defense of the Chinese Nationalist
cause.22 As the anticommunist climate grew in the U.S. during the dec
ade of the 1950s, the tendency for the press to accept the viewpoint of
the China Lobby also expanded. By the mid-1950s the prevalence of
the China Lobby influenced bias in the press was near universal.
For example, Chiang’s most influential American friend, Henry
Luce, turned Time and Life newsmagazines into advocates for the Chi
nese Nationalist Party. A fiercely partisan Republican, Luce readily
blamed Democrats of denying Chiang essential aid and portrayed the
Nationalists as an anticommunist bulwark. These concerns, combined
with his aspirations for a U.S.-influenced China, led him into a loose
affiliation of pro-Chiang advocates, later called the China Lobby. Luce
became one of the more prominent members of the Lobby’s associates,
both due to his wealth and prominence, as well as for his proficiency at
disseminating pro-Chiang propaganda to the American public. Using
Time Inc.’s media outlets—including its magazines, films, and radio
programs—Luce conveyed his conception of a China advancing under
Chiang’s leadership with U.S. patronage. The exact number of copies of
Time and Life that were sold during this period is uncertain, but by
biographer W.A. Swanberg’s estimate, Luce stood guilty of “manipu
lating 50 million people weekly.”23
Another aspect of the use of media to disseminate pro-Chiang
propaganda and change U.S. policy towards China was the effort to
discredit Far Eastern experts who did not continue to embrace the
21
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Nationalist cause after the Communist victory. After Chiang’s defeat,
such Far Eastern experts had come to believe that the Chinese Revolu
tion had run its course and the future of mainland China no longer
involved Chiang as an eventual leader. These experts constituted a small
number of individuals and tended to maintain close ties and associa
tions. Partly due to this intimacy, the close association of the Far
Eastern experts tended to create the impression of unanimity on China
policy, which substantially increased the impact of these scholars’ views
on the American public.
Due to this apparent accord amongst the small group of Far
Eastern experts, the China Lobby set about to discredit this prevailing
school of thought. To this end, Lobby members began to levy the
charge that China specialists had expressed a lack of belief in Chiang, a
conviction in the ultimate triumph of the Communists, and had ulti
mately contributed to Mao’s victory. In the context of the growing
anticommunist climate in the United States, this accusation allowed
the China Lobby to make an effective case for its attack on U.S. foreign
policy. Accusations involving Communist sympathy and the use of
Communist sources were therefore adopted early on in the attempt to
discredit China specialists that were not pro-Chiang.
As these attacks were being written and published, they also began
to gain public exposure through the congressional investigation of
Owen Lattimore. Lattimore was a well-known Far Eastern specialist
and writer who had traveled extensively in China and was generally
recognized amongst scholars as an expert on the interior areas of China
and Mongolia. He was also an ideal target for the China Lobby. By
damaging Lattimore’s reputation and his legitimacy as a Far Eastern
scholar, the China Lobby could more effectively advocate the viewpoint
of a pro-Chiang U.S. policy to the American public. By voicing a proChiang U.S. policy through the outlet of scholarly expertise, the China
Lobby could go a long way in promoting their agenda.
The China Lobby’s attack on Owen Lattimore may have begun
primarily because of Alfred Kohlberg’s unsuccessful attempt to gain
control over the Institute for Pacific Relations. The campaign to dis
credit Lattimore continued for nearly five years, carried on primarily
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through Kohlberg’s publications of Plain Talk and The China
Monthly.24 In early 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy presented a com
plete compilation of all the attacks previously levied on Lattimore by
Kohlberg. These charges made national headlines and focused on
Lattimore as the central player.
The New York Times, for example, described Lattimore as “the top
Russian espionage agent in this country,” and claimed that he was
“dragged by the heels into a Senate subcommittee inves
tigating…charges of communism in the State Department.”25 Lattimore
spent thirteen days testifying before the subcommittee refuting the
committee’s accusations that his writings had been used to further the
cause of the Soviet Union. Without ample evidence to support their
claims, the committee recommended that the Department of Justice
charge Lattimore with perjury. Although the charge was formalized by
the Department of Justice, the court threw out key components of the
indictment on the grounds of their vagueness and eventually dismissed
the indictment. The New York Times offered their take on Lattimore’s
trial: “Mr. Lattimore’s real offense was that he had come to differ
sharply with something he calls ‘the China Lobby.’”26 Although
Lattimore escaped further prosecution, the original purpose of the at
tack was accomplished: the widespread publicity given to the
accusations against had damaged his reputation. Scholars associated
with him also became more vulnerable to accusations of Communist
affiliation by the associates of the Lobby. Moreover, objective informa
tion regarding China policy was diminished while pro-Chiang
propaganda was accentuated.
The encompassing effects of the China Lobby on U.S. foreign
policy toward China are difficult to gauge. To a certain extent the
China Lobby’s views seem to have become widely accepted due to the
anti-Communist climate in the U.S. during the early 1950s, and the
effectiveness of the Lobby’s propaganda efforts. The Lobby was also
24
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highly successful in disseminating the view that anti-Chiang sentiment
meant disloyalty to the United States. The Lobby’s propaganda unques
tionably damaged the reputations of scholars, journalists, and
politicians alike. The widely assorted and loosely affiliated China Lobby
membership effectively used their political connections and media
propaganda to channel their views. Lobby propaganda also fanned the
flames of the growing anticommunist climate in the U.S., helping to
create a political environment where their agenda would be more
acceptable to the American public.
The political pressure that the China Lobby could bring to bear
during the early 1950s should not be underestimated. As Michael
Schaller states, “by the late 1950s, despite a broad agreement on the
need to revisit [China] policy, few politicians were prepared to take the
heat from the China Lobby.”27 The China Lobby and its allies, but
tressed by the Republican Party, were able to aggressively argue for their
cause and to intimidate those that might express contrary viewpoints.
Exemplified through the well-known McCarthy hearings, the penalty
for opposing the anticommunist crusaders and their China Lobby allies
could be severe. However it is fair to say that despite the zeal of
McCarthy and men like him, many of Chiang’s most ardent supporters
actually cared little about China one way or the other, and only found it
a useful issue to advance their personal political agendas. Although the
China Lobby held significant sway over U.S. foreign policy—and had
thus far prevented the formal recognition of the PRC—Chiang Kai
shek was no closer to regaining the China mainland than he had been
since his expulsion by Mao in 1949.
In this regard, the China Lobby achieved mix results in obtaining
their long term goals: Chiang Kai-shek had not “retaken” mainland
China, but Taiwan had also not been overrun by the PRC. And,
although the United States provided the military support necessary to
prevent a Communist invasion of Taiwan (which had seemed immi
nent after the Communist government shelled the nearby islands of
Quemoy and Matsu in 1954), the U.S. had also increasingly advocated a
27
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“two China policy” that recognized both the Communist and
Nationalist governments. Moreover, even though Taiwan became
incorporated into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, severe
limitations were imposed on Chiang’s ability to initiate aggression
against the PRC. In fact, Taiwan’s incorporation into SEATO, was
accompanied not only Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ demand
that Chiang “stop telling his people that their return to the mainland
was imminent,” but also by the notice that the U.S. would refuse by its
Security Council veto power should the United Nations voted to seat
the PRC.28
In the following years, as Lobby members realized that mainland
China had been definitively lost to the PRC, support of Taiwan would
come to be the focal point of the Lobby’s efforts. With the relationship
of the PRC and the United States in a mutually suspicious state of
limbo after 1955, the China Lobby continued to rally for proNationalist causes and the denial of UN recognition for the PRC.
Nonetheless, from 1949 to 1955, the China Lobby unquestionably held
significant sway over public and political perception on the United
States’ China policy, and therefore, significantly influenced policy
developments. Indeed, it can only be speculated how much effect China
Lobby pressure had on politicians and the policies that they rendered.
Although the China Lobby ultimately failed in its goal of returning
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to power in China, it
is nevertheless important to note that it would be nearly twenty years
before the PRC would finally gain admittance to the United Nations.
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